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If Donald Trump were Mexican, would he still be Donald Trump? 
The problem of identity in counterfactuals and a dispositionalist 
solution  
Giulia Casini 
The University of Sheffield 
gcasini1@sheffield.ac.uk  
Abstract The study of counterfactuals has produced some well-known problems 
concerning identity. I focus on two of them. I suggest that a dispositionalist account of 
counterfactuals, not involving possible worlds but dispositions and potentiality, could 
solve both. First is the problem of identity across possible worlds, concerning the 
identification of individuals in various possible worlds. Dispositionalism can solve it: its 
aim is to explain counterfactuals in the actual world, without appealing to possible 
worlds. This would eliminate the problem because the individuals involved in 
counterfactuals would be in the actual world, without needing identification in other 
worlds. Second is the problem of what I call ¶SURSHUW\ DOWHUDWLRQ· In ¶if Donald Trump 
were Mexican, he ZRXOGQ·W be President of the USA·, denying 7UXPS·V property of 
¶EHLQJ a US FLWL]HQ· could lead us to deny the identity between the Donald Trump we 
know and the Donald Trump of the counterfactual. Barbara 9HWWHU·V version of 
dispositionalism can solve also this problem, introducing the concept of ¶SRWHQWLDOLW\· 
Keywords: counterfactuals, possible worlds, identity, dispositions, potentiality, 
properties 
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0. Introduction 
The study of counterfactuals has produced some well-known problems concerning 
identity. The aim of this paper is to show how an account of counterfactuals not based 
on the traditional Lewis-Stalnaker possible world solution could solve some of these 
long-debated issues. The focus will be on two problems: the problem of identity across 
possible worlds and what I call the problem of ¶SURSHUW\ DOWHUDWLRQ· The alternative 
account suggested will be within a variation of dispositionalism set forward by Barbara 
Vetter. The account is still at an embryonic stage, and its development is not in the 
scope of this paper, but we can already see how an account of this kind could bring 
many advantages to counterfactual discussion. 
The paper will have the following structure. In this introduction, I will quickly introduce 
counterfactuals and I will sketch very simply the general concept of identity used in this 
paper. Then there will be six sections and a conclusion. In the first section, I will explain 
the traditional Lewis-Stalnaker account of counterfactuals. In the second and third 
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sections, I will show how the two problems concerning identity arise. In the fourth 
section, I will introduce dispositionalism and Barbara 9HWWHU·V version of it, while in the 
fifth and sixth I will suggest how a new account of counterfactuals based on these could 
solve the two problems. In the conclusion, I will suggest that an account of 
counterfactuals based on Barbara 9HWWHU·V ideas could represent an important alternative 
to the traditional account, because it could solve some relevant issues concerning 
identity.  
Before addressing the main themes of this paper, it will be useful to fix some 
fundamental concepts. The paper tackles some problems concerning identity in relation 
to counterfactuals, so we need to clarify both what this paper treats as counterfactuals 
and which idea of identity it adopts.  
Counterfactuals are some special examples of conditionals. Conditionals are sentences 
with the structure ¶,I A, then &· in which A is called the antecedent and C is called the 
consequent. Some examples of counterfactuals are: 
 
(1) If Donald Trump were Mexican, he wRXOGQ·W want to build the Wall. 
(2) If Donald Trump had been Mexican, he would have not become President of 
the United States. 
 
I will not make a distinction between cases like (1) and cases like (2), calling both 
¶FRXQWHUIDFWXDOV· Note that I use this term as synonymous with ¶VXEMXQFWLYH 
FRQGLWLRQDO· in opposition to ¶LQGLFDWLYH FRQGLWLRQDO· I accept the idea that 
counterfactuals can have both true and false antecedents, so my choice of the name 
¶FRXQWHUIDFWXDO· is only for simplicity, without implying any reference to the meaning of 
contra facta.  
One characteristic of counterfactual conditionals is that they deal with possibility. This 
can be true not only for counterfactuals, but also for other conditionals, like indicative 
conditionals. However, in contrast with other conditionals, the truth of counterfactuals 
does not seem to be determined by actual non-modal facts. Counterfactuals quite often 
involve possibilities that are non-actual and modal facts seem very relevant for their 
truth-value. 
The counterfactuals taken under examination in this paper are some specific ones, that 
is those concerning the possibility for an individual or an object of the actual world to 
be different from what it is: in the examples above, we appeal to the possibility for 
Donald Trump to be Mexican, when we know that he is not. This is the main cause of 
problems with identity, as we are going to see.  
In this paper, I will adopt an extremely naïve concept of ¶LGHQWLW\· without approaching 
the metaphysical issues that this involves. When I talk about identity in this paper, I 
intend qualitative identity, meaning property-based: identity is identity of properties1. This 
means, in this view, that two things should be identical if they both possess the same 
properties and a thing is identical to itself if it maintains the same properties. However, 
again in a very unsophisticated way, I consider that the properties needing to be shared 
or maintained do not need to be exactly all the same properties of the individual, but 
only those that I call core properties. I will not try to define what I mean with ¶FRUH· I 
just want to make a sense of the idea that, in changing the properties of an object, both 
there are some properties that cannot be changed without threatening its identity and 
there is a point in which too much has been changed and the object is not anymore 
                                                          
1 I put qualitative identity in contrast to numerical identity or sameness, by which the relation of identity 
cannot exist between two things. For a general idea on the concepts of identity see Noonan and Curtis 
(2018).   
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identical to itself. Again, my approach to identity is only instrumental to what follows, as 
we will see talking about property alteration. It is not in the scope of this paper to 
address the complexity brought about by the concept of identity, so I hope that the 
sketchiness of its treatment here will be forgiven. 
 
 
1. Lewis-Stalnaker Account 
In the previous section, I outlined what counterfactuals are, while now I will 
concentrate on how we account for them. Comparing them with other conditionals, I 
support the idea that traditional accounts of material and indicative conditionals are 
unsatisfactory or inapplicable to counterfactuals, so that we need alternative accounts. 
One alternative was offered by Robert Stalnaker (1968) and David Lewis (1973), whose 
work on counterfactuals produced what is now known as the possible world account of 
counterfactuals2. A general and simplified version of this account goes as follow: 
 
(PWA)  A counterfactual ¶$ > &· is true at world w iff: 
i) either there is no possible world in which A is true; 
ii) or the worlds in which A is true and C is true are closer to world w than 
the worlds in which A is true and C is false3. 
 
We use the symbol ¶!· to represent the counterfactual arrow. In our analysis, we will 
take world w to be the actual the world, so we will look for the truth of counterfactuals 
at the actual world, and in point ii) we will consider the worlds closer to the actual 
world.  
Our interest is on the specific type of counterfactuals mentioned before, so we will limit 
the application of PWA to examples like this: 
 
(1) If Donald Trump were Mexican, he wouldQ·W want to build the Wall 
 
This counterfactual is true iff: 
 
i) either there is no world in which Donald Trump is Mexican; 
ii) or the worlds in which Trump is Mexican and he GRHVQ·W want to build the Wall 
are closer to the actual world than the worlds in which Trump is Mexican and he 
wants to build the Wall. 
 
The first clause i) is not the case: we can easily expect that there are one or more 
possible worlds in which Donald Trump is Mexican. Therefore, to evaluate the 
counterfactual, we need to take under consideration these worlds, in which the 
antecedent is true ² so that Trump is Mexican ² and then consider the consequent. The 
interesting part of these types of counterfactuals is the antecedent, because it 
contemplates a way in which an object of the actual world could be different. It is at this 
point that the problems with identity arises. For our purpose, we GRQ·W need to discuss 
the second part of ii) and the problem of defining closeness between worlds, as the 
main issues with identity concern overall the first part of the clause.  
                                                          
2 Note that the possible worlds account is not necessarily limited to counterfactuals, but it has been 
extended to indicative conditionals as well, in particular by Stalnaker (1968, 1975). 
3 This is a general version of the account given by me but based on the accounts of Lewis (1973) and 
Stalnaker (1968).  
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As we said, following ii), we need to consider the possible worlds in which Trump is 
Mexican. However, in these possible worlds, is Donald Trump still Donald Trump? Or 
better: is the Donald Trump of these worlds the same of ¶RXU· Donald Trump? From 
these questions, there are two different, yet similar problems that emerge. 
 
 
2. Problem of Identity Across Possible Worlds 
Asking whether the Donald Trump of a possible world is the same of the Donald 
Trump of the actual world implies a prior question: who is the Donald Trump of a 
possible world? There are two possible answers: either he is exactly the Donald Trump 
of the actual world ¶WUDQVIHUUHG· in another world or he is a ¶FRXQWHUSDUW· of the Donald 
Trump of our world. In both situations we are facing what is called the problem of 
identity across possible worlds, but in two different ways. In what follows, I will offer 
only a general overview of this problem, which is very complex and has created an 
intense debate over the years.  
Starting from the second answer, this is called ¶FRXQWHUSDUW WKHRU\· developed by David 
Lewis (Lewis 1968, 1986). The central idea is that individuals cannot exist in more than 
one possible world. Therefore, the individuals of the actual world cannot be in other 
possible worlds. However, if this is true, then we should not be able to use possible 
worlds to judge counterfactuals referring to the individuals of the actual world, because 
they would not be in these other worlds. Lewis solved the problem suggesting that 
possible worlds are populated by counterparts of the individuals of the actual world. This 
allow us to keep using possible worlds for counterfactuals talking about individuals of 
our world: an individual in the actual world and their counterpart in another world are 
two distinct individuals, and when we use a counterfactual, its truth-conditions involve 
facts about the counterpart. However, how do we know that some individual in another 
possible world is the counterpart of an individual of the actual world? How do we 
identify individuals across possible worlds? This is one way in which the problem of 
identity across possible world manifests: admitting that the individuals of some worlds 
have counterparts in other worlds, there is a problem of identification of these other 
individuals as their counterparts.  
A first attempt to solve the problem could come from the idea, initially suggested by 
Lewis, that a counterpart resembles to the original in content and context in important 
respects more than anything else in that world (Lewis 1968: 114). However, this appeal 
to resemblance creates some problems.  
Coming back to our example: 
 
(1) If Donald Trump were Mexican, he ZRXOGQ·W want to build the Wall. 
 
Following counterpart theory, the Donald Trump-s of the possible worlds considered in 
judging this counterfactual are not our Donald Trump, but his counterparts in those 
worlds. However, how do we recognise these individuals in these possible worlds as the 
counterparts of our Trump? Following Lewis, these counterparts have level of similarity 
in the relevant aspects with Donald Trump higher than anything else in these worlds. 
Therefore, we could try to use this idea to identify 7UXPS·V counterparts.  
In a counterfactual like (1), we are looking for worlds in which the counterpart of 
Donald Trump is Mexican. The individual ¶0H[LFDQ 7UXPS· is obviously different from 
the original Trump, who is not Mexican. Are they still similar in a way that we would 
still consider this individual a counterpart of Donald Trump? That is, is the Mexican 
counterpart of Donald Trump still the most similar individual to our Donald Trump in 
these worlds? We could say yes, if we do not consider ¶EHLQJ 0H[LFDQ· a relevant aspect 
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of an individual or we could say no, if we consider that it is. Here is the problem, then: 
how do we decide if ¶EHLQJ 0H[LFDQ· stops a counterpart from being similar enough to 
be considered a counterpart?  
Talking about similarity inevitably brings along a problem of vagueness, because we 
need to put a limit on which aspects are relevant and we need to decide what can be 
changed without two individuals stopping being similar, and these seem quite arbitrary 
decisions.  
Other attempts to tackle the problem of identification across possible worlds have been 
pursued. We could try by saying that the counterparts are identifiable because they are 
called ¶'RQDOG 7UXPS· in these worlds, or because they have his same ¶origin·. Lewis 
engages many of these possibilities in his book On the Plurality of Worlds (1986), but it is 
not in the scope of this paper to discuss the issue in its entirety. It should be enough 
saying that counterpart theory, even if it brings some advantages, it also raises many 
questions and problems.  
Nevertheless, even if we take the first path mentioned above, denying the existence of 
counterparts in other worlds (Kripke 1971, 1980), and suggesting instead that in other 
possible worlds we are still considering the actual Donald Trump, the problem of 
identity across possible worlds is anything but solved, even if it is not a problem of 
identification anymore. 
Without going into much detail, denying that there are counterparts seems to suggest 
that a same individual can be in more than one possible world. The notion of a 
transworld individual is extremely controversial, because it seems to allow the same 
individual to belong to two different worlds at the same time and this seems to put into 
doubt the identity of an individual as one. This comes for the very simple intuition that 
a same individual cannot be in two places at the same time. We could explain this more 
by appealing to the notion of numerical identity, intended as sameness. An individual is 
numerically identical with itself and with nothing else, so there cannot be two 
individuals being in two different places at the same time, that are sharing sameness. 
Note, as I said earlier, that I accept a view in which two things can share qualitative 
identity intended as sharing same core properties, in contrast to the fact that they cannot 
share numerical identity, intended as sameness. However, the problem of transworld 
individuals as presented depends largely on the notion of possible worlds that we adopt, 
whether we think that they really are ¶SODFHV· or not, but I will not discuss this here. 
Again, this is an extreme simplification of a massive debate. The aim of this section was 
only to give a taste of the complexity of the problem of identity across possible worlds, 
without any ambition of covering all its aspects. I just wanted to point out that the 
problem can manifest in two ways: either is a problem of identification between two 
distinct objects in two different possible worlds or is the problem of accounting for how 
a same individual can be in two possible worlds. In the following section, we will discuss 
another problem, which is not completely unrelated to these, but takes a different 
perspective.   
 
 
3. Problem of Property Alteration 
Suspending our judgment on counterparts versus transworld individuals, using 
counterfactuals we come across to another problem: the problem of property alteration.  
Coming back to our example: 
 
(1) If Donald Trump were Mexican, he ZRXOGQ·W want to build the Wall 
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the problem arises, as we can see, because this counterfactual is changing ² altering ² 
the properties of Donald Trump. On one side it is attributing to him a new property, 
¶EHLQJ 0H[LFDQ· and on the other it is removing a known property, ¶EHLQJ a US FLWL]HQ· 
if we assume that the two exclude each other4.  
If we accept the view of a property-based identity as presented in the Introduction, 
playing with properties in this way could make us say that a Mexican Donald Trump is 
not Donald Trump. If being identical with oneself means maintaining the same 
properties unaltered, then this alteration implies that a non-Mexican individual i cannot 
be the same of the Mexican individual L·. However, as we said before, the properties that 
needs to be maintained are the core properties. The main issue now is then to narrow 
what we mean by core properties. This is essential because by removing or adding 
properties to an individual we risk changing them so much that they are not the same 
person anymore. For example, another counterfactual: 
  
(3) If Donald Trump were a poor, socialist, brown haired, Mexican woman, 
he ZRXOGQ·W stand how Mexican immigrants are treated on the US 
border. 
 
In (3), Trump loses most of the properties that help identify him in the actual world: he 
is not rich, conservative, blonde, a US citizen and not even a man. Can we still say that 
he is Donald Trump? Which of these are core properties? How can we decide? 
The problem of property alteration, almost mirroring the issues we had talking about 
similarity, concerns how many properties can be changed before two things and one 
with itself stop being identical. On the one hand, we could say none: all properties are 
core properties and any change would make the two objects not the same object. This 
would be too restrictive: if Donald Trump suddenly became white haired, we would not 
say that he is not Donald Trump anymore. On the other hand, we could say that some 
can be changed: there are some properties that are core properties but there are others 
that can be changed without threatening the identity of the object, so that two things 
keep being identical till a point. However, as said before concerning similarity, the 
decision on which properties are core properties is too gratuitous and it would 
inevitably lead us to a problem of vagueness, because the border between some 
properties can be changed and all properties can be changed is too evanescent. 
We can see how these two problems of property alteration and identity across worlds 
are very complex to solve. Counterfactuals like the ones considered till now inevitably 
are connected to some very important issues concerning identity, whether we are 
considering that there are two individuals, following counterpart theory, or only one. 
Nevertheless, we use counterfactuals like (1), (2) and (3) everyday, altering the properties 
of objects regardless. We need to find a solution. My suggestion is that looking for 
alternative accounts not involving possible worlds could be a valid answer. 
 
 
4. Barbara 9HWWHU·V Dispositionalism 
In looking for an alternative account of counterfactuals, it is useful starting by looking at 
alternative accounts of modality altogether. One of them is dispositionalism. 
Dispositionalism wants to offer an alternative metaphysics of modality, based on the 
actual world rather than on possible worlds. The crucial point is explaining modality 
                                                          
4 For example, because we use ¶0H[LFDQ· meaning ¶EHLQJ a citizen of Mexico, born in Mexico, from 
Mexican parents and belonging to the Mexican ethnic JURXS· and ¶86 FLWL]HQ· meaning ¶EHing a citizen of 
USA, born in USA, from US citizen parents and belonging to the USA ethnic JURXS· 
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through dispositions. This means that all the main categories of modality ² necessity, 
possibility and counterfactuals ² have a dispositional explanation (for possibility, see 
Borghini and Williams 2008). The main feature of dispositions is that they belong to the 
objects of the actual world. If we can explain modality through dispositions then, we 
GRQ·W need possible worlds to do it, because modality can be reduced to the actual 
world5. 
To understand dispositionalism, we must, quite clearly, understand what dispositions 
are. Properties like fragility, solubility and irascibility are dispositions. There are different 
ways to account for this kind of properties. A traditional way of explaining dispositions 
is the Conditional Analysis: 
  
(CA)  The disposition to F of an object x is the property of being disposed to F if G6. 
 
For example, fragility is the disposition to break if struck, solubility is the disposition to 
dissolve if immersed in a liquid, irascibility is the disposition to get angry easily if 
provoked. (CA) has created a strong connection between dispositions and 
counterfactuals, because, for example, the fragility of a glass can be explained through a 
counterfactual like ¶if the glass were struck, it would break·. Therefore, the initial 
approach puts counterfactuals before dispositions, as counterfactuals are used to explain 
dispositions. However, because the aim of the new wave of dispositionalism is to 
explain the whole of modality ² including counterfactuals ² through disposition, (CA) is 
not satisfactory. With the trend reversal trying to explain counterfactuals through 
dispositions, we must try to find alternative ways to express the same idea of (CA) 
without involving conditionals. One alternative could be the Stimulus/Manifestation 
Analysis. 
 
(SMA)  An object has a disposition to F if it has a disposition whose stimulus 
consists in p and whose manifestation consists in q7. 
 
Using again an example, a glass has fragility if it has a disposition whose stimulus 
consists in being struck and whose manifestation consists in breaking. This new version 
has the advantage of not using a conditional structure, substituting antecedent and 
consequent with stimulus and manifestation. Dispositions in this view are constituted by 
these two elements and need both to be defined. Because counterfactuals DUHQ·W 
involved in the account, they can be explained through dispositions. Barbara Vetter 
(2016) tried to develop such an explanation. A first version of True Counterfactual 
could be:  
 
(TC)   ¶,I p were the case, then q would be the FDVH· is true iff the right kinds of 
objects have a disposition whose stimulus consists in p being the case, 
and whose manifestation consist in q being the case (Vetter 2016: 2)8. 
                                                          
5 Note that on this point ,·P supporting what Vetter (2011) calls ¶QHZ acWXDOLVP· (in opposition to 
¶FODVVLFDO DFWXDOLVP·: the view by which ¾¾[p]ossible worlds [«] may be a useful formal device in modal 
logic [«], but they have little to do with the metaphysics of modality¿¿ (Vetter 2011: 1). These actualists 
eliminate completely any appeal to possible worlds.  
6 This is a simplification. For more on the Conditional Analysis see Manley and Wasserman (2008). 
7 Again, this is a re-elaborated analysis coming from what said in Vetter (2011, 2015, 2016). 
8 This version of the account is the simplest given in 9HWWHU·V article (2016). We will not focus on it nor on 
its problems and criticism here, but it is important to see an example of a dispositional account of 
counterfactuals. 
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With (SMA), dispositionalism seems to gain wider ambitions on modality and be able to 
account for counterfactuals. However, both (CA) and (SMA) suffer of the same 
criticism. A glass is still fragile even if it is packed in Styrofoam and it would not break if 
struck because of this, and a person is still irascible even if they are under the temporary 
effect of a tranquilizer and they would not get angry if provoked because of it. Things 
like Styrofoam and tranquilizers are called finks and masks, because they mask, inhibit, 
the relevant dispositions (Martin 1994). Finks and masks are a common problem in 
explaining dispositions, because it can happen sometimes that given the stimulus, the 
manifestation does not happen. For example, the glass even if struck may not break, 
either because it was not struck with enough strength or because it was hit in the wrong 
place. Dispositionalists tried to solve this issue with a ceteris paribus clause, meaning that 
the definition holds all things standing equal, or by appealing to the context, but there 
are still some who are unsatisfied with this definition of dispositions.  
One of them is Barbara Vetter, who has recently (2014, 2015) offered a new way to 
conceive dispositions, introducing a new concept: potentiality. The version of 
dispositionalism relevant for the aims of this paper is hers, as we are going to see.  
There are some crucial points of her view on dispositions. First, she is against the 
Conditional Analysis: for her, fragility is not the disposition to break if struck, but simply 
the disposition to break. Second, she promotes a Manifestation-Only Analysis: a glass 
has fragility if it has a disposition whose manifestation consists in breaking. From these 
two points we can see that Vetter chooses an explanation involving one element rather 
than two. This is because the final stage of her explanation of dispositions requires only 
one element. As a matter of fact, she finally argues that dispositions must be ascribed to 
potentialities, supporting what I call a Potentiality Analysis. 
 
(PA)  The disposition to F is the potentiality to F9. 
 
For example, a glass has fragility if it has the potentiality to break. Dispositions do not 
need a conditional explanation, nor a stimulus-manifestation relation to be accounted 
for: they only need potentialities.  
However, we need to explain what potentialities are and in which way they differ from 
dispositions. To explain the difference, Vetter says that all dispositions are potentialities, 
but not all potentialities are dispositions (2015: 19). Potentiality is a much broader 
category, including also abilities for example. Another difference stated by Vetter is that 
while dispositions are context-sensitive properties (Ivi: 20), potentialities instead are the 
context-insensitive properties that are the metaphysical background of dispositions (Ivi: 
21). To understand in which sense dispositions are context sensitive, talking about 
fragility, we can see that (i) first it dRHVQ·W belong to all things that can break ² for 
example we ZRXOGQ·W say that gold is fragile, but we cannot deny that gold can break ² 
and (ii) second that it can be inhibited ² as we saw in the example of Styrofoam. What is 
fragile and the fact that some fragile things have their fragility inhibited depend on the 
context. On the contrary, if we consider the potential to break, Vetter suggests that (i) it 
belongs to all things that can break, from crystal to gold, and (ii) it belongs to objects in 
any circumstances, independently whether the object would or would not break in that 
context. To use a metaphor, potentiality is at a much deeper level in objects than 
dispositions. A disposition failing to exhibit its manifestation is irrelevant for the 
potentiality to which it is ascribed. 
                                                          
9 (PA) is formulated by me on the basis of 9HWWHU·V work, for more details on potentiality and dispositions 
see Vetter (2015). 
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In her book on potentiality (2015), Vetter outlines an account of counterfactuals based 
on potentiality rather than on dispositions. This sketch is based on could/might 
counterfactuals and it refers to ¶LWHUDWHG· potentialities.  
 
(COULD) ¶,I x were F, then x could/might be *· is true iff x has an iterated 
potentiality to be G, and being F is an earlier stage in that iterated 
potentiality10 (Vetter 2015: 226). 
 
Being this just an embryonic and partial stage in the development of a full account of 
counterfactuals based on potentiality, in this paper we will not comment on it in details. 
To pursue a complete and satisfactory account of counterfactuals is not in the scope of 
this work. However, if this account sees its culmination, the advantages would be many 
for counterfactual theory. Here, I just want to show some of these advantages: in 
following a potentiality-based account, we can solve the two problems with identity 
discussed above. 
 
 
5. Solving Identity Across Worlds 
The solution of the problem of identity across possible worlds is easy to imagine. As we 
said before, dispositionalism does not require possible worlds to explain modality, 
including counterfactuals. Even within the new account based on 9HWWHU·V idea, 
counterfactuals are explained not by possible worlds but by potentialities. Because 
potentialities, like dispositions, are properties belonging to the objects of the actual 
world, then counterfactuals can be explained appealing to the objects of the actual 
world, rather than to the objects of other worlds.  
In our example, 
 
(1) If Donald Trump were Mexican, he ZRXOGQ·W want to build the Wall 
 
for judging the counterfactual, we need to consider the potentiality to be Mexican 
belonging to the Donald Trump of the actual world. Following 9HWWHU·V view, we do not 
need to consider the Donald Trump-s of other worlds, because the potentiality required 
is only the one belonging to the Trump of the actual world.  
If the account of counterfactuals does not require the Donald Trump-s of other worlds, 
then we do not need to worry whether these Trump-s are counterparts of our Donald 
Trump or if they are himself but in other worlds. The problem of identity across worlds 
makes sense only if we must consider the same individuals in other possible worlds, but 
if we limit our scope to the actual world, then the problem does not concern us 
anymore. We do not need to ask how to identify some individuals as counterparts of the 
original nor we need to account for an individual to be in more than one possible world.  
More than offering a solution to the problem of identity across possible worlds, an 
account of counterfactuals based on potentiality eliminates the problem from the 
beginning, because without possible worlds, this issue does not even arise. Other similar 
                                                          
10 To explain what Vetter means with ¶iterated· potentiality, it is easier going through an argument going 
as follow:  
Premise 1: Things have potentialities to possess properties. 
Premise 2: Potentialities are properties. 
Conclusion 1: Therefore, things should have potentialities to possess potentialities. 
Conclusion 2: This GRHVQ·W stop here, things can have potentialities to have potentialities to have 
potentialities and so forth. 
Any of these potentialities is called by Vetter iterated potentiality (Vetter 2015: 136). 
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issues concerning identity, like the analogous problem of identity across time, would 
require more discussion, and maybe cannot be solved in the same way, but it is not in 
the scope of the paper offering a solution to them. The aim is to solve identity across 
possible worlds, and I believe that potentiality deals with this problem successfully.  
 
 
6. Solving Property Alteration 
The solution of the problem of property alteration is more complex. In earlier parts of 
this paper, I tried to explain the difference between dispositions and potentialities. 
Nevertheless, for the intent of this work, this difference is not essential. For my aim, I 
do not need to commit to an account of counterfactuals based on potentiality or on 
dispositions, because what I am going to suggest can work with both. Therefore, for 
simplicity, I will start calling potentialities and dispositions ¶SRWHQWLDO SURSHUWLHV· ,·P not 
considering this an extra category of higher order, rather just a name valid for both 
kinds, to separate them from other types of properties, that I will call ¶WUDGLWLRQDO· or 
¶DFWXDO· properties. 
Potential properties differ remarkably from traditional properties. The best way to 
explain this is through some examples. A traditional property is the property of being F, 
like the property of being transparent. A potential property, instead, is the property of 
possibly (potentially) being F, like the property of fragility (possibly be broken), or 
irascibility (possibly be angry). It is important to notice that potential properties belong 
to an object like the traditional properties: for example, a glass has fragility as a property. 
However, potential properties refer to other properties that the object could have: 
fragility implies that the glass could gain the property of being broken. Equally important 
is to say that the object does not need to be F to have the potential property of being F. 
For example, a glass is fragile, and so has the potential to be broken, even if it is not 
broken11. 
Having certain potential properties then do not necessary imply having certain 
corresponding traditional properties, so that having a potential property does not 
determine for sure which other properties the object must have. If ¶EHLQJ IUDJLOH· is 
necessary for the glass to acquire the property of ¶EHLQJ EURNHQ· nevertheless it is not 
sufficient for the glass to acquire this property, because a fragile glass may never break. 
TrumS·V potential property of being Mexican does not imply that he also has the actual 
property of being Mexican. Trump can potentially be Mexican and still be a US citizen: 
attributing a potentiality is not like changing the actual properties of an object. As 
fragility belongs to a glass even if it is not broken, Donald 7UXPS·V potential property of 
being Mexican belongs to him even if he is not Mexican. Trump does not need to give 
up nor to add any of his actual properties, because the potential property of being 
Mexican does not clash with the actual property of being a US citizen12. The potential 
property of being Mexican does not mean that Donald Trump has the property of being 
Mexican, but that he could have the property of being Mexican. There is not a real 
alteration of Donald 7UXPS·V properties, but an attribution of a potentiality.  
The counterfactuals we are considering are very specific, concerning the possibility for 
an individual or an object of the actual world to be different from what it is. This ¶EHLQJ 
GLIIHUHQW· thus far has been associated with a change of properties, either denying that 
                                                          
11 Fragility is a peculiar property, because we could say that when the glass breaks, it stops existing, or that 
it stops being a glass, becoming, for example, ¶SLHFHV of JODVV· However, a comparable reasoning can be 
done for a property like irascibility, where this issue does not emerge. 
12 Note that here I keep using ¶EHLQJ 0H[LFDQ· and ¶EHLQJ US FLWL]HQ· as if the two properties are excluding 
each other, referring to what said in footnote 4 of this paper.  
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some properties belonging to the individual belong to them or attributing some 
properties that do not belong to them. However, what we are saying now is that with 
potentiality we are not making such a change. When we are using a counterfactual like 
(1), we are attributing a potentiality to the object, which does not necessary imply a 
change in its actual properties. Because of this feature, such counterfactuals may not be 
a threat to the identity of the object, because they do not really involve property 
alteration.  
Potentiality does not come without a cost, though. Some opponents could argue that 
some of the issues relating to property alteration have analogues for potentialities. For 
example, potential properties are themselves properties, so we could risk of facing again 
the same problem: how many potentialities can we attribute to an object before it stops 
being identical with itself? Also, there are other problems, not strictly concerning 
identity. For example, a natural question could be whether Donald Trump can have the 
potential property of being Mexican, given his actual properties. The problem here 
involves the scope of a certain potentiality: what in the world can have the potentiality 
to be Mexican? What can have the potentiality to break? Thinking that any potentiality 
could belong to anything in the world seems unacceptable: we would not say that 
Trump has the potentiality to break, nor that a glass has the potentiality to be Mexican. 
We could try to delimitate the scope of some potential properties as depending on some 
actual properties: for example, the potential property of being Mexican depends on the 
property of being human, and the potential to break depends on the property of being a 
destroyable object. This would also help delimiting which potential properties can be 
changed before an object stops being identical with itself, because it would depend on 
its actual properties. However, this would mean that there is an asymmetry between 
actual properties and potential properties: while actual properties can determine which 
potential properties an object can have, potential properties on the contrary do not 
determine the actual properties of an object, as we said earlier. All these issues are 
strictly related to a discussion on the nature of potentiality, which is far beyond the aims 
of this paper13. However, I do not believe that such issues should imply that an account 
of counterfactuals based on potentiality should not be pursued, as I think its advantages 
are still very desirable.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
Counterfactuals involving individuals of the actual worlds have always represented a 
problem, because they mostly engage with how these individuals could be different 
from what they are. Because of this feature, these counterfactuals create issues with 
identity. How can we conceive an individual different from what they are, but at the 
same time maintain their identity? This is where the problem of property alteration 
comes from: counterfactuals, because they concern possibility, comprehend also the 
possibility for something to be different from what it is, that is, to have different 
properties. Altering the properties of an object is a threat to its identity. We can try to 
differentiate between core and non-core properties, but this add more hurdles, because 
we cannot decide what is core and what is not in a conclusive way. 
The traditional possible world account of counterfactuals does not seem to solve this 
issue, but instead create more problems, including the problem of identity across 
possible worlds. If we need other worlds to account for counterfactuals involving 
individuals, then we need to explain either how an individual of one world can be in 
                                                          
13 For more on the nature of potentiality, see Vetter (2015). 
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another world, or how an individual of one world can be identified with one of another 
world.  
The solutions I suggested come from a simple thought: eliminating the problems. The 
problem of identity across possible worlds mostly depends on the introduction of 
possible worlds in the account. An account not involving possible worlds would make 
the problem irrelevant to counterfactuals. The problem of property alteration arises 
from the changes of actual properties necessary to conceive the counterfactuals 
discussed. An account in which these changes are not treated like an alteration in the 
actual properties of the objects would avoid this issue. 
An account of counterfactuals based on dispositionalism or on potentiality seems to tick 
all the desired boxes. Avoiding possible worlds, it avoids the problem of identity across 
possible worlds. Introducing potential properties, it avoids the problem of property 
alteration.  
On the first point, anchoring dispositions and potentialities to the objects of the actual 
world and suggesting that counterfactuals are explained by these, detach counterfactuals 
from possible worlds and allow us to ignore trans-world identity issues. 
On the second point, crucial is the fact that potential properties are different from 
actual properties. Potential properties attribute to an object the possibility to have 
another property without the necessity for the object to have it: for example, fragility, 
which implies the possibility to break, belongs to a glass even if it is not broken. In the 
same way, Donald 7UXPS·V potential property of being Mexican belongs to him even if 
he is not Mexican. The key is that there is not a real alteration of Donald 7UXPS·V actual 
properties, but an attribution of a potentiality. 
A complete account of counterfactuals based on dispositions and potentiality still need 
to be fully developed, aiming also to solve some issues related to potentiality, but I hope 
that with this paper I have given some reason to wish for this account to come into the 
world soon. 
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